Benjamin, Adorno, Horkheimer, Bieber?

            I remember a discussion I had with a friend about how Facebook and Twitter has allowed any person to become “celebrity.” They most likely won’t attract hordes of followers and paparazzi, but today anyone can experience the sensation of others viewing their lives and are able to (or attempt to) construct an image of how others perceive them in an unprecedented way. In a similar fashion, Blogger/Wordpress, Flickr, Deviantart, Bandcamp, etc. allow anyone to be an author, a photographer, an artist, or a musician, with an engaged audience (however small). While there’s a blatant gap in time and technology, this idea complicates our readings in an interesting way in terms of blurring the lines between an industry, an author, and the public.

            Benjamin enters this notion in terms of cult and exhibition value, which seem to be divided by the smallest margin thanks to the aforementioned applications.  Because the cult value is dependent on objects “existence, not their being on view” (The Work of Art… 5), we can imagine the fine line between photographs that are viewed only by the individual taking them, and those same pictures being uploaded to a site viewed by any number of followers. While Benjamin suggest the transition to exhibition occurs “all along the line” (6) of photography, I wonder how he would view the fact that most of us carry around cameras on our phones that allow for greater availability to ritualistic photographs, while simultaneously allowing easier exhibition of them than ever before. If a father snaps a picture of his son on the kid’s birthday, it seems like the user decides which pole of reproduction the photo would take; the transformation would occur instantaneously and, more importantly, independent of other similar works.

             For Horkeimer and Adorno, I see this issue fitting into their understanding of culture and industry, but immanently modifying it through the idea of the masses. “Because culture presents itself as a bonus,” they say, “its reception has become a matter of taking one’s chances. The public crowds forward for fear of missing something” (131). Reading this made me instantly think of a tween girl religiously following Justin Bieber’s tweets, but then I realized I’m in no position to criticize due to my constant reloading of reddit (where, incidentally, most of my Bieber news is foisted upon me). And while I’m sure many of us have sites or blogs that we follow and track, the idea that most of us engage in our own social media sites paints us as part of the problem. We’re not churning out CGI vomit like Michael Bay, but we’re producing our own microcosm of culture that others are constantly checking. In this way, do we not constitute consumers of culture as well as part of the industry?

            

Thoughts on the Frankfurt School

After reading Dialectic of Enlightenment, I found the Frankfurt School's ideas about the "culture industry" thought-provoking; of course, some more compelling than others. The authors seem to make bold claims and conclusions (eg, culture industry = negation of style) without discussing all sides of their argument. On the other hand, when they say on p. 105-106 that cultural tyranny dictates that "you are free to not think as we do...but you will be a stranger among us," my ears perk up, and I start thinking about musicians over the years -- Johnny Cash, NWA, Lauryn Hill, Dixie Chicks, to name a few -- that have been pushed out of the mainstream for their nonconformist ideas.  In this chapter, Horkheimer & Adorno have much to say on the cost of free thinking, and I like the directness and ambition of their arguments. For example:  "The hiding places of mindless artistry, which represents what is human against the social mechanism, are being relentlessly ferretted out by organizational reason, which forces everything to justify itself in terms of meaning and effect" (114). This quote could be applied to everything from the comedy of Andy Kauffman and Chris Farley, to the short fiction of Barry Hannah or Aimee Bender.  American culture, for some reason, crowns those artists whose art they can better understand, logically or intellectually, rather than artists who don't explain their art but simply show it.

Thoughts on a Footnote

(I’m going to be moderately obnoxious and center my response on a footnote from an edition of the essay other than the one assigned for class. I’ll try to give enough of the footnote to clarify. I think this is worth doing because of the unique density of recurrent Hegelian-Marxian terms.)

In the version of this essay that Benjamin first intended for publication, from May 1936, there is a note that follows the description of film’s ability to take advantage of a frightened actor’s genuine response (our sections IX and X). At this point in the essay, Benjamin is exploring the particular ways in which the technical possibilities of film can alter perception (the development of this technology is an expression of changes in the mode of production). His footnote, however, moves from the specifics of film to the more philosophical, general mechanisms of social change. On such manipulation of actor’s real reactions for artistic purposes (I remember reading that Ridley Scott did this for the famous chestbursting scene in Alien) Benjamin writes: “Nothing shows more graphically that art has escaped the realm of “beautiful semblance” which for so long was regarded as the only sphere in which it could survive.”

In his footnote to this sentence, he seeks explain that "beautiful semblance" by unfolding several concepts which are “as tightly interfolded as cotyledons”. He writes:

In mimesis…slumber the two aspects of art: semblance and play. Of course, this polarity can interest the dialectician only if it has a historical role. And that, in fact, is the case. This role is determined by world-historical conflict between the first and second technologies…what is lost in the withering of semblance and the decay of the aura in works of art is matched by a huge gain in the scope for play. This space is widest in film.
 

Less interesting, I think, than whether or not this has been born out by the intervening use of film, is looking at how Benjamin’s use of dialectics and materialism/economism are on display here. He takes the practices of film making (not viewing, in this section) and looks for fundamental changes in what is possible—what can be done (very Marxian). He does this by unpacking the polarities and contradictions within the object (very Hegelian and Marxian). By doing so, he sees a new type of art in the methods now possible via reproducing/recording—an art that is no longer “auratic”. This doesn’t mean that art doesn’t have aura—rather that new art doesn’t have aura. I think of a music group like Animal Collective. What is an Animal Collective song? What semblance is there? none to a musical score, or a composers ideal. Rather there is a pastiche, a democratized (Adorno would say degraded and commoditized) experience of play. The music industry is the most extreme example of this—people often complain that there is no “new” music, we just recycle. The same is true of internet memes and new media in general. New technologies have enabled new, less auratic, types of art.

Benjamin, in the 30s, sees film as providing more scope for play and moving away from semblance. To him it signals a revolution into a new era. And maybe this is even more true in the age of technological access to the point where were don’t even need reproductions anymore. We have The Cloud. Of course, while the digital age certainly feels revolutionary, and engenders a change in human perception, I don’t know that it’s necessarily liberating the proletariat or fighting fascism--much as we wanted the Arab Spring to be the Twitter Revolution. But that is really a question of content—I think the process that Benjamin is describing, and his really genius methods of doing so, are useful. Now maybe if I can perform some semblance of it, I’ll be able to start making more sense of the world.

Thoughts on the First Thesis

Benjamin’s Theses on the Philosophy of History appears to read as a death knell of sorts for historical materialism. Set out in the metaphor of a supposed automaton that could defeat even the most skilled chess players, Benjamin ties the work of theology and historical materialism together closely.

“The puppet, called “historical materialism,” is to win all the

time. It can easily be a match for anyone if it enlists the

services of theology, which today, as we know, is small and

ugly and has to keep out of sight” (p. 253)

Two points strike me as interesting about this short introductory vignette.

First, the relationship between the dwarf and the puppet—or theology and historical materialism, respectively. The concealed man guides the puppet’s hand. Yet, he can do only that which is beneficial to the puppet. In this, it is the man who serves the interest of the puppet; he is a slave to the otherwise inanimate puppet. I wonder about the qualities with which this imbues the puppet. Does it become, in some regard alive? Although the puppet and man are two entities, they function as one. Missing either and the Turk cannot function. Similarly, theology and historical materialism are bound, one to the other. By reconsidering our positions in relation to each and their relationship to each other, theses forces might be mobilized in a productive, even revolutionary manner. 

Second, the quotation marks around “historical materialism” stand out against the rest of the sentence. Perhaps this implies that the puppet does not function as “real” material historicism, but is instead only referred to as such. Transferred, perhaps Benjamin is not so concerned with some sort of “real” material historicism—something that would be less problematic. Rather, that which is given the name “material historicism” and the manner in which the concept was considered was most problematic. I certainly do not claim to be well-read enough to be able to suggest less problematic form of historical materialism, however I am interested the possibility that such might exist and am curious as to its implications.  

His argument unfolds from this vignette—historicists understand history as one move after another, thinking one move ahead to see what might bring about a the final checkmate. Instead, we might have more success by thinking backwards—seeking to understanding the constellation of forces—concealed and evident—that brought the board to its current condition. 

"A Pure Dream?" ... Thoughts on Althusser

"A Pure Dream?"

Thoughts on Althusser

"Ideology, then, is for Marx an imaginary assemblage, a pure dream, empty and vain, constituted by the 'day's residues' from the only full and positive reality, that of the concrete history of concrete material individuals materially producing their existence" (160). I found it interesting that Althusser took this negative sense of Marx's conception of ideology and gave it a positive one by suggesting that this dream of ideology-- the imaginary relation of individuals to their real conditions of existence-- is non-historical because it is omni-historical. For Althusser, then, ideology is more like a Freudian dream, emerging from an unconscious that has no history in that it is eternal.

On the sharing of such a dream, Althusser's elaboration on the reproduction of the systems of production (which seems initially to emerge in Marx's reading of his classical economist contemporaries) also interested me. Although the educational system constitutes the dominant ideological state apparatus, Althusser injects this state of affairs with some hope insofar as it seems that resistance is, at least, not entirely futile.

Building on Althusser's concept of "interpellation"-- by which the state "hails" individuals as (always already) subjects-- I wonder how any (resistant?) form of self-interpellation could come into play. "The category of the subject is only constitutive of all ideology insofar as all ideology has the function (which defines it) of 'constituting' concrete individuals as subjects," writes Althusser, "In the interaction of this double constitution exists the functioning of all ideology, ideology being nothing but its functioning in the material forms of existence of that functioning" (171).

But would "resistant interpellation" (of a resistant ideology) just be subsumed by the hegemonic subject-formation? Attempting to resist such interpellation would be an identification of oneself in resistance to-- and therefore, in relation to-- its opposition. Think: the punk movement. And capitalism has fed off of this individualistic tendency by commodifying self-expression. Is the "ironic hipster" figure an attempt at inviting a resistant form of misrecognition?

Would this idea also bear resemblance to Althusser's concept of epistemology as the separation of the (in)/essential real and the concept of ideology as the separation of the (in)/visible -vs.- the concept of the envisioned truth dictated through Logos? People seem to enter into language games where the entire objective is self-identification "with" or "against" something-- perhaps proclaiming that they are part of the "invisible" element of society, deserving of but not obtaining recognition. In a documentary-jumping Netflix tangent at one point, I landed on a documentary about people obsessed with finding Big Foot, and I began to question whether it would really be in these people's best interest to find Big Foot. Wouldn't their sense of self be shattered if they actually proved Big Foot's existence and convinced everyone that they had been right all along? They would no longer be one of the initiates of their esoteric insight. It seems that this could be "read" either way... Is the "with or against" narrative itself a requisite part of hegemony, or does it really show any resistance to it? Would a language game whose only objective is the identification of an individual in one's own ideological terms be pro-hegemony because it would be pro-interpellation, or is there a way for ideology not to become hegemonic?

I'm not completely sure I'm making sense here. In any case, Althusser was like a breath of fresh air for me this week, perhaps partly because he vocalizes the visionary, prophetic sense with which Marx seems sometimes to be read. I know this goes further than Althusser's condemnation of the religious sort of visionary-grounded reading, but I've been a bit bothered lately by a sense that some of the readings seem to invoke a conversion narrative of sorts. It seems to be heralded by Marx as its prophetic visionary, some of the works seem to be addressed to "individuals" in the hope of making them socialist/communist "subjects," the narrative ends with a transformation that brings forth an ideal existence within a communal paradise, and it has its own book of "Revelation," which could similarly "mean" "Apocalypse." Not that I could envision Lenin knocking on my door to ask if I'd heard "the Good News about Marx." On Lenin, though, I find myself wondering what similarities could be found between "liberating by force" and England's rationalized "colonizing by force." Maybe I'm being too cynical...?  

Ominous Hands & Ideology

It is clear that Althusser values ideas on some level, because he is concerned with the right definitions, questions, and answers. This gives him the methods to both help us understand "Marx's philosophy" and they ways in which other Marxist's (and even -oids) fit together. As he points out toward the beginning of "From Capital to Marx's Philosophy,"Marx and his followers "carry with them not only the Marxist theory of history...but also Marx's philosophical theory, in which they are thoroughly steeped...even in the inevitable approximations of its practical expression." (I think this very much pertains to Robert's distinctions on the how vs. the whether or not types of arguments--Marx did the former--theoretical practice in the manner of Capital, most people want do the latter--real practice in the manner of burning cars or enjoying pension funds depending on your background).

So, what's Althusser's big insight? Mostly, I guess it's the way ideology functions within Marx. "Marx's Philosophy" gets at this when he talks about Marx's own methods of reading, and they way in which he was able to answer questions that weren't yet clear, in addition to requiring readers to work on his terms. Futhermore, Althusser consistently (I think) uses the assemblage of "economic, political, and ideological"when discussing modes of production. This expansion of the field of determining factors for society to explicitly include ideology comes out clearly when he writes,

we have paid great attention to the concepts in which Marx thinks the general conditions of economic production and the concepts in which Marxist thought much think its theory of history, not only to grasp the Marxist theory of the economic region of the capitalist mode of production, but also to ascertain as far as possible the basic concepts (production, structure as a mode of production, history) whose formal elaboration is equally indispensable to the Marxist theory of the production of knowledge, and its history. (44)

From that foundation, we can begin to derive an idea of how we might perform ideology critique (he cites Foucault), and knowledge work that might take the form of beneficial class struggle, or progress, or subversion to the system that pays it. Then we can work in the modes of elucidation, elaboration, and investigation and not feel entirely complicit. So that seems to have potential as an affirmation for a knowledge worker who doesn't want to just be producing little exploitation machines. But maybe I'm doing this wrong if I'm that worried about self justification.

(The invisible hand this week was the one in the margins of the photocopy--physical traces of the labor that goes into ideas.)

Education as the site of struggle.

In Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatuses Althusser makes the assertion that education has become the dominant ISA.  Certainly, this proclamation – while apt – was not surprising.  First it pairs nicely with Gramsci’s conception of the traditional intellectual.  That is to say, if those who are supported by the state tend to theorize in favor of hegemonic structures, it stands to reason that the intuitions that manage would also serve hegemonic interests.  

                Beyond this theoretical juncture, I have to say that personal experience has verified the pressure within higher education to conform curriculum to the training of workers. At all three universities I have taught, I have been encouraged to justify my classes in terms of the “real world” (read capitalist) skills they would develop in the students.  Additionally, the majority of students I have talked to are interested in their degrees only insofar as it gets them a higher paying job. Based on this, I find it difficult to find fault with Althusser’s proclamations.

                Luckily, neither Althusser, nor Gramsci, suggest the case is hopeless for us as academics.  While both note that the systems are work pervasively in the favor of capital, they also suggest there is room for resistance.  But what ought to be the nature of that resistance? Althusser calls those teachers that attempt to educate outside ISA norms “heroes.”   Gramsci moves it a step further, noting that if traditional intellectuals work in concert with organic intellectuals they can foster the “expansive hegemony” that allows resistance to hegemonic forces.

                Does this mean that the better use of academic time is field work?  Working with those engaged in struggle to help unify their causes.  Or should we focus more on honing classroom material? Working to making sure that we try to help students move beyond dominant ideological positions.  Of course, these are by no means mutually exclusive, but as different universities prioritize different focuses for professors it does seem as a choice one has to make when plotting an academic future.